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I. INTRODUCTION
The production, distribution, and use of sexually explicit materi-
als involving minors' has become a multi-million dollar industry.2
1. This Note uses the terms "child pornography" and "sexually explicit material
involving minors" interchangeably. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (a)(1)(A) (1988) defines these terms as a
"visual depiction involv[ing] the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." Section
2256(2) states:
(2) "sexually explicit conduct" means actual or simulated-
(A) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital,
or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex;
(B) bestiality;
(C) masturbation;
(D) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
(E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.
See also HOWARD A. DAVIDSON & GREGORY A. LOKEN, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND PROS-
TITUTION: BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (1987) ("In simple terms, child pornogra-
phy is the permanent record of the sexual exploitation and abuse of a child.").
2. See ANN W. BURGESS, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEX RINGS 8 (1984). Quantifying
the amount of sexually explicit material in circulation or the number of children used in
producing these materials is difficult, if not impossible, because of the clandestine nature of
their production and distribution. Id.; see also DAVIDSON & LOKEN, supra note 1, at 1 ("In
1977 there were at least 260 different monthly magazines published in the United States, with
such names as Torrid Tots, Night Boys, Lolita, Boys Who Love Boys, and Children Love."). A
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:235
Although contradictory data exist on whether viewing "porno-
graphic ' 3 material causes sexual aggression,4 pedophiles 5 generally
collect child pornography.6 Regardless of whether viewing sexually
explicit material leads to sexual offenses against minors, producing
these materials victimizes children.7 In addition to the physical, psy-
chological, and emotional harm caused to those depicted, some
pedophiles use these "permanent records" of abuse as part of a
scheme to lure other children.'
The use of children to create pornography has stirred feelings of
indignation and concern nationwide and has led to a vehement assault
on the problem through innovative law enforcement techniques.9
1986 Senate Report concluded that child pornography enterprises grossed several million
dollars per year. Id.; see also Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, § 2, 98 Stat.
204 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251-2254 (1988)).
3. Pornography has not been legally defined. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22
(1973) ("[N]o majority of the Court has at any time been able to agree on a standard to
determine what constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to regulation under the
States' police power.").
4. See U.S. COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 27 (1970) ("In sum, empirical research
designed to clarify the question has found no evidence to date that exposure to explicit sexual
materials plays a significant role in the causation of delinquent or criminal behavior among
youth or adults."). But see Effect of Pornography on Women and Children: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 17
(1984) [hereinafter Effect of Pornography]; see also ATTORNEY GEN.'S COMM'N ON
PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL REPORT 938 (1986) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GEN.'S REPORT].
5. A pedophile is a person who prefers children as sexual partners over adults. See
KENNETH LANNING, Situational and Preferential Sex Offenders, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
OF THE CHILD 30 (Thomas M. Frost & Magnus J. Seng eds., 1986). Lanning distinguishes
between the situational pedophile, who uses a child for sexual gratification simply because the
child happens to be available, and the preferential pedophile who prefers children even though
he has adult options. Id. at 28. See also ATTORNEY GEN.'S REPORT, supra note 4, at 609.
6. See DANIEL S. CAMPAGNA & DONALD L. POFFENBERGER, THE SEXUAL
TRAFFICKING IN CHILDREN: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CHILD SEX TRADE 30 (1987); see
also Effect of Pornography, supra note 4, at 35.
7. In New York v. Ferber, Justice White wrote:
[T]he use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the
physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child .... The distribution of
photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically
related to the sexual abuse of children . . . . [T]he materials produced are a
permanent record of the children's participation and the harm to the child is
exacerbated by their circulation.
458 U.S. 747, 758-59 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Child Protection Act of 1984, supra
note 2 ("Thousands of children including large numbers of runaway and homeless youth are
exploited in the production and distribution of pornographic materials."); Effect of Pornogra-
phy, supra note 4, at 39 ("The only way you can produce child pornography is to sexually
molest a child.").
8. Pedophiles use child and adult pornography to lower a victim's inhibitions by
presenting the desired activity as the norm. See ATTORNEY GEN.'S REPORT, supra note 4, at
411; see also Effect of Pornography, supra note 4, at 32-33.
9. See infra notes 85-139 and accompanying text.
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Because both the production' ° and distribution of sexually explicit
materials involving minors are difficult to detect and prevent through
conventional means," law enforcement officials have resorted to
undercover operations to apprehend purchasers of child pornogra-
phy. 12 Recently, the government has focused its efforts on enforcing
federal laws prohibiting the sale and receipt of sexually explicit mater-
ials involving minors through the mail.13 In these operations, the gov-
ernment's focus has been on purchasers, rather than on producers.
14
To identify purchasers, the government has set up mock organi-
zations which target certain "predisposed"' 15 individuals and solicit
orders for child pornography. While these elaborate and deceptive
undercover operations have resulted in numerous convictions,' 6 they
raise serious concerns about entrapment and protection of individual
due process rights.
This Note explores the legal ramifications of undercover child
pornography "sting" operations by analyzing the recent decision of
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Jacob-
son17 The Postal Inspection Service targeted Keith Jacobson as a
potential customer of child pornography when police searched the
Electric Moon, a reputed California "pornography bookstore," and
discovered his name on a mailing list.'I Jacobson's name appeared on
the mailing list because he had previously ordered two magazines
from the Electric Moon featuring nude adolescent boys and a
brochure listing stores in the United States and Europe that carried
10. See Effect of Pornography, supra note 4, at 32; see also ATTORNEY GEN.'S REPORT,
supra note 4, at 406 ("[A] large amount of child pornography is "homemade" for private use
or barter with other pedophiles, making the amount of child pornography actually produced
difficult to determine.").
11. See GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 74 (1988).
12. See ATTORNEY GEN'S REPORT, supra note 4, at 413.
13. See United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted in part, Ill
S. Ct. 1618 (1991); United States v. Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1686 (1991); United States v. Musslyn, 865 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984). See also Bob Cohn,
A Fresh Assault on an Ugly Crime, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 14, 1988, at 64.
14. See JOHN RUBERTI, Child Pornography and Pornographers, in SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION OF THE CHILD, supra note 5, at 12; see also Mike Brown, Government Sting
Worked; Critics Charge Entrapment, LOUISVILLE, KY. COURIER-J., Oct. 19, 1987, at 7; Ken
Myers, 'Sting' Nets 15 Child-Pornography Recipients, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 8, 1986, at 28; Susan
Kuczka, Government Details Child-Porn Crackdown, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 31, 1984, at 3.
15. See infra notes 168-90 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 85-167 and accompanying text.
17. 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted in part, 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991).
18. Id. at 468.
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sexually explicit materials.19 None of the materials were illegal.2°
Posing as hedonist organizations advocating sexual freedom,2
the Postal Inspection Service sent Jacobson a sexual attitude question-
naire and a membership application, which he completed and mailed
in with his membership fee.2 2 Although Postal Inspection Service
regulations for undercover operations require that an individual's
name appear on at least two independent sources 23 before the individ-
ual is sent a sexual attitude survey, Jacobson's name had been found
on only one source, the Electric Moon's mailing list.24 Nevertheless,
Jacobson was the target of five undercover sting operations.2 5
Jacobson's responses to the sexual attitude questionnaire
revealed his "preference for preteen sex."726 The Postal Service then
mailed him another survey (to which he responded "positively"27 ),
and a list of "pen pals" who shared his sexual interests.28 Jacobson
began corresponding with one of these pen pals, an undercover postal
inspector.29 Over a period of twenty-seven months, Jacobson received
"two sexual attitude surveys, seven letters measuring his appetite for
child pornography, and two sex catalogues. ' 3° The fictitious organi-
zations assured him the mailings were completely legal.3 ' He
responded on eight occasions and finally requested Boys Who Love
Boys from a Postal Service catalogue and a set of sexually explicit
photographs of young boys from a Customs Service brochure.32 After
a controlled delivery of the magazine,3 3 the Postal Service searched
19. Id.
20. Id. at 471 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 468.
23. Id. at 473 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The sources were to include:
mailing lists seized by postal inspectors in separate child pornography
investigations; incoming child pornography seized by the United States Customs
Service; programs conducted by the FBI; investigations of mail order dealers of
child pornography -conducted by metropolitan police departments and state
police agencies; or Postal Inspection Service regional testing programs.
Id. (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 472.
25. Id. at 471.
26. Id. at 468.
27. Jacobson's response to the survey was: "Please feel free to send me more information.
I am interested in teenage sexuality." Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 476 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 468.
33. During a controlled delivery, after a suspect picks up the "contraband" from his post
office box, postal inspectors follow him and search his home pursuant to a previously issued
warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Jacobson's home, where they found the illicit magazine and arrested
him for receiving it through the mail in violation of federal law. 4
At trial, Jacobson raised two defenses. First, he argued that he
had been entrapped as a matter of law, but the court found sufficient
evidence of predisposition to submit the issue to the jury." Second,
he asserted that the government's conduct was outrageous, thus vio-
lating his due process rights.36 The jury rejected his defenses and
found him guilty of knowingly receiving through the mail sexually
explicit material depicting a minor.3 He appealed his conviction to
the Eighth Circuit. A panel of the Eighth Circuit heard the initial
appeal and reversed the trial court, holding that the government must
have a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing before targeting an indi-
vidual. 38 The Eighth Circuit then heard the case en banc and affirmed
the trial court, holding that the government's actions did not consti-
tute entrapment or outrageous governmental conduct, despite the
government's lack of a reasonable suspicion to target Jacobson as a
predisposed consumer.39
This Note argues that governmental sting operations used to tar-
get and arrest purchasers of child pornography must be subject to
stricter procedures to preserve individual rights. Current entrapment
and due process analyses do not properly scrutinize the government's
conduct in undercover child pornography operations. Courts should
require governmental agents to have at least a reasonable suspicion
before they target an individual in a child pornography sting
operation.
Part II presents the entrapment and due process defenses, and
shows how federal courts have applied both. By allowing the govern-
ment to bar either defense by proving the defendant's predisposition,
34. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 468. Jacobson never received the photographs. Id.
35. Id. at 470.
36. Id. at 469.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (a)(2) (1988) states:
(a) Any person who-
(2) knowingly receives or distributes any visual depiction that has been
transported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed or knowingly
reproduces any visual depiction for distribution in interstate or foreign commerce
or through the mails, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
Id. at 468.
38. United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999, 1001 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated, 899 F.2d 1549
(8th Cir. 1990).
39. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 467 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted in part, 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1990).
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courts have effectively merged the two defenses, leaving a "predis-
posed" defendant without a legal defense. Part III analyzes United
States v. Jacobson,4" illustrating the Eighth Circuit's rejection of the
due process and entrapment defenses. Part IV criticizes the Eighth
Circuit's willingness to allow the government to prove a defendant's
predisposition to purchase child pornography through the mail by
simply showing that the defendant did so at the government's behest
because it erodes the prosecution's standard of proof. Part V con-
cludes that the government must conduct child pornography sting
operations within specific guidelines. The egregious nature of child
pornography should not change the balance between law enforcement
and individual rights.
II. PERSPECTIVE
A. The Entrapment Defense
Entrapment is the "conception and planning of an offense by [a
law enforcement] officer, and his procurement of its commission by
one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persua-
sion, or fraud of the officer."'" The United States Supreme Court first
recognized the defense of entrapment in Sorrells v. United States.42
The government indicted Sorrells for possessing and selling whiskey
to a prohibition agent in violation of the National Prohibition Act.43
In accepting Sorrells' entrapment defense on public policy grounds,
the Court stated: "'When the criminal design originates, not with the
accused, but is conceived in the mind of the government officers, and
the accused is by persuasion, deceitful representation, or inducement
lured into the commission of a criminal act, the government is
estopped by sound public policy from prosecution therefor."'"
Justice Roberts' concurrence in Sorrells marked the beginning of
an alternative analysis in entrapment cases. Roberts believed the
Court's inquiry should focus on the government's conduct, while the
majority believed it should focus on the defendant's predisposition to
commit the charged offense.45 Commentators refer to Roberts' view
as the "objective theory" of entrapment and to the majority's
40. Id.
41. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 443.
43. Id. at 438. Sorrells refused to sell the agent whiskey two times. After exchanging war
stories for a while, he finally acquiesced. Id.
44. Id. at 445 (quoting Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1924)).
45. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973) (discussing Justice Roberts'
concurrence in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932)).
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approach as the "subjective theory. '"46 These analytical approaches
reflect different conceptions about the underlying purpose served by
the entrapment defense. The subjective theory, which continues to be
the majority view in the Supreme Court, precludes a finding of entrap-
ment once the government establishes the defendant's predisposition
to commit the charged offense. Conversely, the objective view allows
a finding of entrapment--despite the defendant's predisposition-if
the government's conduct in procuring the arrest exceeds tolerable
limits. 47 Subsequent decisions reveal the tension created by these dif-
fering approaches to entrapment analysis.
The Court implicitly reaffirmed Sorrells4" in Sherman v. United
States.49 In Sherman, the defendant met a government informant at a
doctor's office where both were undergoing drug addiction therapy. °
After several casual meetings, the informant requested that Sherman
supply him with narcotics because he was not responding to treat-
ment. 5' Although the defendant refused these requests several times,
he eventually sold drugs to the informant and was prosecuted for the
offense.5 2
The Court reversed Sherman's conviction and rejected the gov-
ernment's argument that the defendant was predisposed to commit
the offense. It approached the case using the subjective theory, focus-
ing on the defendant's predisposition, rather than the government's
conduct. First,, it noted that the police failed to find any narcotics
while searching the defendant's apartment." Thus, the government
lacked evidence of Sherman's drug use independent of those incidents
involving the informant. Second, the government introduced no evi-
dence that the defendant was in the narcotics trade or that he had
made a profit from the drug sales to the government informant.54
Finally, the Court held that the defendant's prior convictions for the
sale and possession of narcotics were not probative of a willingness to
sell narcotics at the time of the incident in question." The Court,
46. See Edward G. Mascolo, Due Process, Fundamental Fairness, and Conduct that Shocks
the Conscience: The Right Not to Be Enticed or Induced to Crime By Government and Its
Agents, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984).
47. The objective approach set out in Justice Roberts' concurrence seems to be a precursor
to the due process defense the Supreme Court later recognized in Russell.
48. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433-35 (1973) (discussing Sherman's
impact on Sorrells).
49. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
50. Id. at 371.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 375.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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however, did not ignore the objective theory altogether. It described
the government's conduct as "evil" because it enticed someone avoid-
ing drugs not only to sell, but also to use them. 6
In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter argued that the
court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction when police conduct
"falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for the
proper use of governmental power."' - 7 Justice Frankfurter contended
that the defendant's predisposition was irrelevant because the under-
lying reason for the entrapment defense was to prevent the police
from ensnaring individuals into criminal activity regardless of their
past history.58 Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Sherman parallels
Justice Roberts' concurrence in Sorrells, and both have served as
harbingers for the idea that certain law enforcement techniques vio-
late deeply rooted expectations about appropriate government con-
duct.59 Although the Court rejected the objective theory of
entrapment in Sherman, it later recognized the theory's underlying
purpose in the due process defense.
B. The Due Process Defense
The Supreme Court first recognized the due process defense, in
dicta, in United States v. Russell.60 Russell was indicted for manufac-
turing, selling, and delivering methamphetamine in violation of fed-
eral law after a government agent supplied him with an essential, but
otherwise available, ingredient.6' Although the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit and rejected Russell's entrapment defense,
it acknowledged that a violation of due process would be a valid
defense in certain situations: "While we may some day be presented
with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so
outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the gov-
ernment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, the
instant case is distinctly not of that breed."'62
The Court justified its rejection of the due process defense in
Russell by stating that infiltrating drug rings was often "the only prac-
56. Id. at 376.
57. Id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 382-83.
59. See Mascolo, supra note 44, at 17-18.
60. 411 U.S. 423 (1973); see also Jill Burtram, Note, The Failure of the Due Process
Defense in United States v. Gamble, 63 DENY. U.L. REV. 327, 3039 (1986) (tracing the
development of the due process defense).
61. Russell, 411 U.S. at 424.
62. Id. at 431-32 (citation omitted).
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ticable means of detection. ' 63 The Court concluded that the govern-
ment's limited participation did not violate the Due Process Clause. 
6
The Court, however, failed to define the level of governmental partici-
pation in a crime or the type of governmental conduct that would
violate the defendant's due process rights.65
When confronted with the opportunity to delineate the contours
of the due process defense, the Court severely restricted it. In Hamp-
ton v. United States,66 a plurality of the Court in effect collapsed the
due process and entrapment defenses into one by allowing proof of the
defendant's predisposition to preclude both defenses. Hampton
involved a "full-circle" sale: government agents supplied the narcot-
ics and resold them to government agents, with the defendant acting
solely as a middleman.67 Rather than focusing on the government's
conduct, the plurality concluded that Hampton's predisposition
barred both his entrapment and due process defenses.68 In response
to Hampton's entrapment defense, the Court stated that "[t]he rem-
edy of the criminal defendant with respect to the acts of Government
agents ... lies solely in the defense of entrapment. ' 69 However, the
Court found that Hampton's predisposition effectively precluded his
entrapment defense.7°
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion7 1 in Hampton limited the
due process defense to situations where the government's activity vio-
lates one of the defendant's protected rights. 72 However, no existing
right ensures complete freedom from governmental deception or
investigation. Thus, Rehnquist's body of "protected rights" may in
effect be a very small, if not an empty, set of rights.73 The Court
reasoned that if the police engage in illegal activity which does not
violate the defendant's "protected rights," the remedy lies in prose-
63. Id. at 432.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see also Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 185
(1976) ("The Russell opinion did not describe the types of instigation which might be
prohibited by due process.").
66. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
67. Id. at 485-86.
68. Id. at 489-90.
69. Id. at 490.
70. Id.
71. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White joined in Justice Rehnquist's opinion. Justices
Powell and Blackmun concurred in the result. Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall
dissented, and Justice Stevens took no part in the decision. Id. at 484.
72. Id. at 490.
73. See Mascolo, supra note 46, at 34 (arguing that the position of the Hampton plurality
is unrealistic because "it is difficult to conceive of police conduct that would directly infringe
upon a separate protected right of one predisposed to the commission of the very offense of
which he is charged.").
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cuting the police, not in barring the defendant's conviction. 74 There-
fore, according to the plurality, a predisposed defendant can raise
neither an entrapment nor a due process defense.75
The concurring opinion 76 questioned the plurality's adoption of a
per se rule prohibiting a predisposed defendant from raising a due
process defense, regardless of the outrageousness of the government's
conduct." According to the concurrence, Russell did not foreclose
the possibility that circumstances might arise where the Court could
rely on due process principles or its supervisory power to bar convic-
tion of a predisposed defendant.7
The Hampton dissent argued that even under the subjective
approach to the entrapment defense, the Court should reverse Hamp-
ton's conviction.79 It distinguished Russell from Hampton on two
grounds. First, in Russell, the government had not actually supplied
the contraband itself, but only a legal ingredient necessary to produce
the illegal drug.80 Second, the defendant in Russell was engaged in an
ongoing enterprise, which continued beyond the government agent's
participation. 8 The dissent thus believed that the government was
not actually promoting a law enforcement interest in Hampton
because its method did not discover ongoing drug traffic.82 Rather,
the government created the defendant's criminal behavior by deliber-
ately enticing him to commit a crime and then convicting him for the
offense.83 According to the dissent, "that the accused is 'predisposed'
cannot possibly justify the action of government officials in purpose-
fully creating the crime. "84
74. Compare Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (remedy for illegal
police activity is prosecution of the police, not freeing the defendant) with Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-96 (1914) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-60 (1961)
(exclusionary rule is the only effective deterrent to governmental violations of protected
rights).
75. The current Supreme Court has not spoken on the availability of the due process
defense to a predisposed defendant.
76. 425 U.S. at 491 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
77. Id. at 492.
78. Id. at 493-95. "Disposition of those claims [in Russell and earlier entrapment cases]
did not require the Court to consider whether overinvolvement of Government agents in
contraband offenses could ever reach such proportions as to bar conviction of a predisposed
defendant as a matter of due process." Id. at 493.
79. Id. at 496 (Brennan, Stewart, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
80. Id. at 497-98.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. Brennan proposed that an alternative inquiry in entrapment analysis might be
whether the defendant would have obtained the contraband from a source other than the
government. The jury charge in entrapment cases would include this question. Once the
[Vol. 46:235
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C. Federal Court Decisions on Child Pornography Stings
The clandestine and pervasive nature of the child pornography
industry as well as the devastating effects on the children exploited 5
may require the use of undercover operations to apprehend purchas-
ers. The government often uses reverse stings involving the sale of
child pornography. 6 Because the government not only supplies, but
also markets the contraband, these operations raise classic entrap-
ment issues. Yet, the very nature of the commodity being sold and the
highly emotional issues it raises make objective evaluation of the gov-
ernment's conduct difficult.
Perhaps to further a political agenda, federal courts have consist-
ently sided with the government in cases challenging the validity of
child pornography sting operations.87 In fact, no child pornography
sting operation has ever been challenged successfully in a federal
court.88 While it is true that the clandestine nature of the child por-
nography industry may require increased governmental efforts to
apprehend offenders, current cases have allowed the government too
much latitude in child pornography stings.
In United States v. Thoma, 9 for example, the government
indicted the defendant for mailing a videotape consisting of children
engaged in sexually explicit conduct to undercover postal service
agents.90 Calling themselves the "Crusaders for Sexual Freedom"
("CSF"),9 1 postal investigators targeted Thoma after receiving infor-
mation that he was "purchasing pedophilia through the mail and
might be involved in producing pedophilia."92 Concluding that this
information provided the government a good faith basis to investigate
Thoma, it solicited information from him.93 Thoma initially refused
accused offered evidence that the government supplied the contraband, the prosecution would
bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt either (1) that the government was not
the supplier or (2) that the defendant would have obtained the contraband elsewhere. Id.
85. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 89-167 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 89-167 and accompanying text.
88. See Appellee's Brief at 10, United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990)
(No. 88-2097NE), cert. granted in part, I11 S. Ct. 1618 (1991) ("[E]very occasion in which a
Court of Appeals has been called upon to assess the conduct of government agents involved in
undercover operations that were virtually identical to the operation utilized in the present case,
those courts have held that the operations did not constitute outrageous government
conduct.").
89. 726 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984).
90. Id. at 1193.
91. Id. at 1194.
92. Id. The defendant also had a prior arrest on child pornography charges. Id. at 1195.
93. "[B]ased upon the information [Postal Inspector] Ruberti received about defendant's
activities the Government had a good faith basis for investigating defendant." Id. at 1198.
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to respond to the government's solicitations,94 but he later responded
to more than thirty advertisements in the CSF newsletter and sold
videos by mail to several postal inspectors."
Thoma raised the defenses of entrapment and of outrageous gov-
ernment conduct-the due process defense-at trial and on appeal.96
The court found that Thoma was predisposed and rejected his entrap-
ment argument.97 In its analysis, the court applied the following fac-
tors to determine predisposition:
(1) the character or reputation of the defendant; (2) whether the
suggestion of criminal activity was originally made by the Govern-
ment; (3) whether the defendant was engaged in criminal activity
for a profit; (4) whether the defendant evidenced reluctance to
commit the offense, overcome by Government persuasion; (5) the
nature of the inducement or persuasion offered by the
Government. 98
The court viewed the defendant's reluctance to commit the offense as
the most important factor.99
The court also rejected Thoma's alternative argument that the
outrageousness of the government's conduct in using the CSF cover
violated his due process rights." ° In doing so, the court contrasted
Thoma's situation, in which the government merely purchased con-
traband from a willing seller, with a case in which the government
actively supplied or produced contraband. 10' Because Thoma mailed
the illicit videos to the undercover investigators and the government
did not supply him with any of the obscene materials, the court con-
cluded that the government's inducement did not amount to miscon-
duct. Thus, it distinguished sting operations from reverse sting
operations,' 2 finding the latter entailed more egregious governmental
conduct.
Contra United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 474 (1990) (Heaney, J., dissenting)
(dismissing as dicta the Thoma court's statement that a good-faith basis prior to investigation
is not a constitutional prerequisite), cert. granted in part, 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991).
94. Thoma, 726 F.2d at 1194. A postal investigator sent Thoma a sexual attitude survey,
which he tore up. Police found the torn pieces in Thoma's garbage while conducting a "trash
cover" of his residence. Thoma also failed to respond to a pamphlet containing "questions
from fictitious members, responses from the editorial staff, and ninety advertisements that
covered a wide variety of sexual tastes." Id. Postal Inspector John Ruberti authored all the
material that Thoma received. Id.
95. Id. at 1195.
96. Id. at 1193, 1196-97.
97. Id. at 1197.
98. Id. (citing United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1983)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1199.
101. Id.
102. A sting operation involves the government's purchase of contraband from a seller
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Mirroring the Hampton plurality, the Thoma court effectively
collapsed the due process and entrapment defenses by making predis-
position the litmus test for both defenses. It stated, "When a defend-
ant is predisposed to commit the offense due process cannot be
violated by Government inducement; to hold otherwise would be to
allow a predisposed defendant to raise the functional equivalent of an
entrapment defense."'' 0 3 Consequently, a predisposed defendant can
raise neither an entrapment nor a due process defense against the gov-
ernment's conduct in a reverse child pornography sting.
In United States v. Johnson,"° the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit rejected the defendant's entrapment and due process defenses
and upheld his conviction for sending and receiving child pornogra-
phy through the mail. 05 Johnson, a confessed pedophile,"'° had
mailed and received orders for child pornography for ten years.'0 7
Postal inspectors began investigating Johnson when he responded to a
mock advertisement the government had placed in Screw
Magazine.0
8
The court rejected Johnson's entrapment defense, concluding
that the prosecution had ample evidence to prove Johnson's predispo-
sition beyond a reasonable doubt. "o Because Johnson took the initia-
tive in soliciting pornographic material from the government, the
court did not believe the government had "seduced [Johnson] to crim-
inal activity.'' o In fact, the court concluded that "Johnson's predis-
position to enlarge his collection at any cost developed long before his
correspondence with postal inspectors."''
Johnson's due process defense also failed. The court listed four
whom it later prosecutes for the offense. A reverse sting operation involves the government's
sale of contraband to a buyer whom it later prosecutes for the offense.
103. Thoma, 726 F.2d at 1199.
104. 855 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1988).
105. Id. at 304-05.
106. Id. at 300.
107. Id. at 303-04. Although the United States Customs Bureau confiscated one of his
overseas orders, Johnson remained undeterred. Id. at 304. Johnson's collection of pedophilic
materials included "100 magazines, 58 books and booklets, 13 reels of film, and numerous
drawings. The collection also included advertising brochures that contained sexually explicit
photographs of children." Id. at 300.
108. Id. at 304. Johnson's letter responding to the ad stated:
I am interested in family fun and young girls. I will buy 8mm films, magazines
and photo sets, (Hard core only). I am over the age of 21, and I am not affiliated
with or acting for any censorship or law enforcement agency. All material is
intended for my personal use.
Id. at 300.
109. Id. at 303.
110. Id. at 304.
111. Id.
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factors for determining whether police activity impinged on due pro-
cess protections: "(1) the need for the type of government conduct in
relationship to the criminal activity; (2) the preexistence of a criminal
enterprise; (3) the level of the direction or control of the criminal
enterprise by the government; [and] (4) the impact of the governmen-
tal activity to create the commission of the criminal activity." '12
Applying these factors, the court concluded that the govern-
ment's conduct was not so outrageous as to violate the defendant's
due process rights." 13 First, the court found that the clandestine
nature of the child pornography industry justified the government's
solicitations through magazine ads.I 4 Second, the evidence suggested
that Johnson had collected child pornography long before the govern-
ment solicited his order." 5 Third, the court believed that the postal
inspectors exercised no control over Johnson's alleged criminal activ-
ity nor did the postal inspectors' tactics "disproportionately increase"
the transmission of child pornography through the mail." 6 Finally,
the court relied on Johnson's initiative in responding to the advertise-
ment." 7 Although the Sixth Circuit's application does not explicitly
collapse the due process defense into the entrapment defense, the sec-
ond factor it considered in rejecting Johnson's due process defense-
Johnson's previous involvement with child pornography-incorpo-
rates predisposition into the due process analysis.
The Eighth Circuit first addressed the issue of the use of reverse
sting operations in child pornography investigations in United States
v. Musslyn,1 8 a case in which the defendant asserted only a due pro-
cess defense. In 1982, the government "identified [Musslyn] as a per-
son who had an interest in child pornography" and targeted him for
investigation. The Postal Inspection Service sent Musslyn a CSF
membership application. He completed the application revealing his
interest in sexually explicit material involving preteen children." 9
After requesting CSF's current issue, Musslyn corresponded with a
postal inspector and finally met her at a bar in Kansas City, where he
reiterated his interest in child pornography. 20 In 1985, the "Ameri-
can Hedonist Society," another postal undercover operation, targeted
112. Id. at 305 (citing United States v. Robinson, 763 F.2d 778, 785 (6th Cir. 1985)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 865 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1989).
119. Id. at 946.
120. Id.
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Musslyn. 21' He remitted their membership application as well.12 2
And in 1987, "Operation Borderline" sent Musslyn a brochure offer-
ing sexually explicit photographs of children because of his history of
correspondence with the Postal Inspection Service and a 1986 convic-
tion for child sexual abuse. 123 Musslyn eventually ordered four pack-
ets of sexually explicit photographs of minors.
124
At trial and on appeal, Musslyn contended that the government's
involvement in this reverse sting operation was "so overreaching and
outrageous as to bar prosecution as a matter of due process of law."
125
Nonetheless, the court rejected this defense on the very same ground
that would have precluded an entrapment defense: predisposition.
"The outrageous government conduct defense is not available to
Musslyn because he was clearly predisposed to order child pornogra-
phy and the government agents involved only acted in concert with
Musslyn's illegal request."1 26 The court further emphasized-as the
Johnson court had-that the nature of the child pornography industry
justified the government's undercover tactics.
Thus, applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hampton v.
United States,127 the Eighth Circuit effectively reduced the govern-
ment's requisite showing for a conviction. In order to defeat both the
entrapment and outrageous government conduct defenses, the govern-
ment need only prove predisposition. Therefore, at least in child por-
nography cases, the Eighth Circuit has made the government's nature
and burden of proof for both the defenses of entrapment and outra-
geous government conduct the same.
The latest decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upholding child pornography stings parallels the Eighth Circuit's rea-
soning in Musslyn. In United States v. Mitchell,121 postal inspectors
found the defendant's name on a confiscated mailing list of a com-
pany129 from which he had previously purchased a sexually explicit
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. In 1986, Musslyn pled guilty to charges of child sexual abuse. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 946.
126. Id.
127. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
128. 915 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1686 (1991). Mitchell was
decided on October 1, 1990; Jacobson was decided on October 15, 1990. See United States v.
Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted in part, 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991).
129. Mitchell's name appeared on Catherine Stubblefield Wilson's mailing list. Wilson
allegedly controlled 80% of the child pornography market in the United States. Her mailing
list, which consisted of thousands of names, was circulated to postal inspectors throughout the
United States and became a source for potential "targets." Id. at 525 n.5.
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magazine depicting minors. 130 Using this information, they sent him
a four page application for membership in "Love Land," an organiza-
tion purportedly espousing the "right to seek pleasure without the
restrictions... [of] an outdated puritan morality." 131 "Love Land"
assured Mitchell that it could provide pornographic material to him
"without [the] prying eyes of United States Customs seizing [his]
mail." 132 The defendant then requested more information, and postal
inspectors sent him a catalog offering a variety of explicit materials.1 33
When Mitchell picked up his order for Torrid Tots, postal inspectors
followed him, searched his home and arrested him. 134
Before trial, Mitchell moved to dismiss his indictment on the
grounds that the government's outrageous conduct violated his due
process rights. 135 The district court denied the motion, finding Mitch-
ell predisposed to commit the offense and the government's conduct
not outrageous.' 36 After entering a conditional guilty plea, Mitchell
appealed.' 37  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Mitchell's
purchase was voluntary and had not involved governmental "prod-
ding." 138  The court did acknowledge a high level of governmental
130. Mitchell ordered Skoleborn School Children, an illegal Swedish child pornography
magazine, from Wilson. Id. at 525.
131. Id. at 522-23. The application surveyed applicants' views on a number of sexual and
non-sexual activities. Id. The court described the application as follows:
The application had ten parts. Several of the parts required applicants to express
their attitudes toward a broad spectrum of sexual and non-sexual activities. Part
"D" required applicants to indicate whether they were in favor of, undecided
about, or opposed to, activities alphabetically ranging from "animal training" to
"water sports." Part "E" required applicants to indicate the degree of enjoyment
(on a 4-point scale, with 1 being the highest) they received from fifteen types of
sexually oriented materials including those presenting "pin-ups," "swingers"
clubs, heterosexual activity, and homosexual activity. Part "F' asked applicants
to reveal their attitudes (on a 3-point scale) about sexually explicit materials,
sexual freedom in all activities, and sexual freedom for all consenting persons
without any age restrictions. Part "G" asked applicants to indicate whether they
enjoyed hobbies such as painting, music, and photography. Part "H" asked
applicants to indicate their age at the time of their first sexual experience and to
indicate what they considered to be the best age for a first sexual experience.
Finally, the application said, in all capital letters, "I understand that the
information which I have produced shall be held in strict confidence by the
society and that all information received by me from the society shall be held in
strict confidence by me."
Id. at 523.
132. Id. at 523.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 523-24.
135. Id. at 522.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 526. The court distinguished Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir.
1971), which held that the pressure government agents applied to "prod" the defendants into
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY STINGS
involvement in the operation, but the dispositive factor was whether
the defendant had purchased the contraband "willingly and without
pressure."1 39
III. UNITED STATES V. JACOBSON: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
REDEFINES PREDISPOSITION AND REJECTS THE
DEFENDANT'S ENTRAPMENT AND DUE
PROCESS DEFENSES
In United States v. Jacobson,"4 the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that the Postal Service's use of mock organiza-
tions to target an individual and solicit mail orders for child pornog-
raphy did not violate due process, despite the government's lack of a
reasonable suspicion that the individual was receiving child pornogra-
phy through the mail. 1 ' The court dismissed the requirement of rea-
sonable suspicion, stating that the "Constitution does not require
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing before the government can begin
an undercover investigation."' 42
Jacobson appealed his conviction on two grounds. 4 3 First, he
argued the government entrapped him as a matter of law because the
postal inspectors devised the criminal plan, "implanted the disposi-
tion to purchase child pornography into Jacobson's otherwise inno-
cent mind,"'" and because Jacobson ordered the illegal magazine at
their insistence.' 45 Viewing the evidence most favorably to the gov-
ernment, the court refused to dismiss the action on the basis of
entrapment as a matter of law. It reasoned that "this is not a case in
which the government was a manufacturer rather than a detector of
illicit activity could only be construed as a "veiled threat" where the government acted as a
criminal "syndicate" in the defendants' eyes. Id.
139. Id.
140. 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted in part, 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991).
141. Id. at 469.
142. Id.
143. Jacobson raised two defenses at trial: entrapment and outrageous government
conduct. On appeal, he argued that the government should not have targeted him as a
potential consumer because they lacked a reasonable suspicion that he was predisposed to
criminal activity. Id. at 468. The court disposed of this contention, stating that "Jacobson has
no constitutional right to be free of investigation." Id. at 469.
Jacobson also drew an unsuccessful analogy between child pornography undercover
operations and investigatory detentions (which require that police have a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity). The court believed this analogy was constitutionally unwarranted.
Although "Terry stops" do implicate the individual's Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures, the court found no corresponding constitutionally protected right to be
free from undercover investigation. Id. at 469.
144. Id. at 468-70.
145. Id. at 470.
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crime." 146
The Eighth Circuit believed that the lower court had properly
submitted Jacobson's case to the jury because entrapment as a matter
of law exists only when uncontradicted evidence establishes the
defendant's lack of predisposition. 4 7 Despite the fact that Jacobson
had no record of violating child obscenity laws,14 1 the court con-
cluded that the prosecution had presented "ample evidence" that the
government had merely afforded Jacobson opportunities to purchase
child pornography and had renewed its offers when Jacobson
responded. 49 However, the court conceded that the government had
measured Jacobson's predisposition by his response to the sexual atti-
tude questionnaire it had sent him and not by any other outside
source.150 Contrary to federal regulations requiring a target's name to
appear on two outside sources, in Jacobson the defendant's initial
responses validated subsequent targeting.
The court also rejected Jacobson's second contention that the
Postal Service's investigatory techniques were sufficiently outrageous
governmental conduct to violate his due process rights.' 5' Although
the court recognized that due process principles might bar the govern-
ment from obtaining a conviction when it used "outrageous" investi-
gatory conduct, it required that the level of outrageousness be" 'quite
high.' 152 In this instance, the court concluded that the govern-
ment's conduct did not reach that level of outrageousness. 53
Following the majority in Hampton, 54 the court's due process
analysis focused on the defendant's conduct in deciding whether the
government's conduct was permissible.' 55 The court found that the
postal inspectors did not exert "extraordinary pressure on Jacob-
146. Id. The record in this case is unclear as to whether the postal inspectors produced the
child pornography they advertised. Cf United States v. Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir.
1990) (government prepared all of the materials, including the child pornography, used in a
number of undercover operations), cert. denied, I I S. Ct. 1686 (1991).
147. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 470.
148. Id. at 471 (Lay and Heaney, JJ., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id. The previous panel opinion concluded that Jacobson's responses to the sexual
attitude survey "indicated a predisposition to receive through the mails sexually explicit
materials depicting children." United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999, 1000 (8th Cir. 1990).
151. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 469.
152. Id. (quoting Gunderson v. Schlueter, 904 F.2d 407, 410 (8th Cir. 1990)).
153. Id. at 470. "We simply cannot characterize the government's conduct in Jacobson's
case as outrageous." Id.
154. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
155. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 470. But see United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 382 (3d Cir.
1978) (Adams, J., dissenting) (arguing that the due process defense is not just another name for
the objective theory of entrapment, which focuses on the government's conduct instead of the
defendant's predisposition to commit a crime).
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son."156 Unlike potentially coercive face-to-face contacts, 157 the court
suggested that Jacobson simply could have thrown the mailings away
if he had no interest.Is' Because he responded to the mailings instead,
the court equated Jacobson's expressed interest in preteen sexuality
with a willingness to purchase pornographic material through the
mail.'5 9 In the court's view, Jacobson's case was indistinguishable
from United States v. Musslyn,' 6° where a similar undercover child
pornography operation withstood constitutional scrutiny.
However, the Eighth Circuit's reliance on Musslyn is problematic
for two reasons. First, the government arguably had a reasonable sus-
picion that Musslyn would purchase child pornography based on
prior incidents. No such prior incidents existed in Jacobson. Second,
the court in Musslyn refused to recognize a due process defense sepa-
rate from a valid entrapment defense. Instead, it allowed the same
factor that barred an entrapment defense-predisposition-to bar a
due process defense. Once the court concluded that Jacobson's
entrapment defense was barred because of predisposition, it did not
have to reach his due process argument.
The majority's opinion in Jacobson elicited two dissenting opin-
ions. 161 Chief Judge Lay believed that the government had entrapped
Jacobson as a matter of law. He found no evidence in Jacobson's rec-
ord indicating a predisposition to purchase child pornography
through the mail and argued that the case was improperly submitted
to the jury. 162
Judge Heaney accepted Jacobson's "reasonable suspicion" argu-
ment and his claim of outrageous governmental conduct.' 63  The
judge asserted that targeting Jacobson "violated federal law enforce-
ment guidelines requiring an investigative agency to have a reasonable
suspicion before investigating an individual that the prospective target
is engaging, has engaged, or is likely to engage in illegal activities of a
156. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 470.
157. Id. But see United States v. Musslyn, 865 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming the
defendant's conviction where the government's conduct included face-to-face contact).
158. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 470.
159. Id.
160. 865 F.2d at 945.
161. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 470-71 (Lay and Heaney, J.J., dissenting).
162. Jacobson's criminal record included only a 1958 conviction for driving under the
influence. In addition, Jacobson's purchases from the Electric Moon, the pornography
bookstore where the Postal Service found Jacobson's name, were lawful, and thus arguably
irrelevant for purposes of establishing predisposition. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 471. Judge
Heaney believed Jacobson was not predisposed to receiving child pornography through the
mail. Id. at 472 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 472, 476 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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similar type."' '6 But for the government's failure to follow its own
investigative guidelines, Jacobson would have continued to be a law-
abiding citizen "minding his own business."' 65 The Postal Service's
continuous solicitations to Jacobson for nearly two and a half years
appalled Judge Heaney.' 66 He believed the government's outrageous
deception and temptation required a reversal of Jacobson's
conviction.' 67
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Validity of Jacobson's Entrapment Defense
1. THE SUBJECTIVE THEORY
The subjective theory of entrapment, adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Sorrells v. United States,'6' evaluates the
defendant's predisposition to commit the charged offense. 69 Under
this theory, once the prosecution establishes predisposition, the gov-
ernment's conduct-no matter how reprehensible-is not entrap-
ment. In Jacobson, the Eighth Circuit found that the defendant was
predisposed to receive child pornography through the mail, despite
his lack of a criminal record for violating child obscenity laws
through the mail or prior specific instances of such conduct. 70
Although the police found Jacobson's name on a customer list of the
Electric Moon, a reputed "pornography bookstore,"' 7'1 Jacobson's
lawful purchases hardly established a predisposition to purchase ille-
gal pornography through the mail.' 72  These purchases, at most,
164. Id. at 471. The government targeted Jacobson even though his name appeared on only
one mailing list and his purchase from this store was completely legal. Id. at 473. But see
United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1199 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[W]hether the investigators
violated their own self-imposed standards or procedures is irrelevant to the determination
whether defendant's rights were violated as these standards do not grant [the] defendant any
rights."), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984).
165. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 471 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 476. In his dissent, Judge Heaney wrote:
Jacobson's conviction thus was the culmination of the Postal Service's two and
one-half year campaign to induce this heretofore law-abiding farmer to violate
the obscenity laws....
In its pursuit of Jacobson, I believe the Postal Service's direct and
continuous involvement in the creation and maintenance of opportunities for
criminal activity rises to that demonstrable level of outrageousness which violates
due process.
Id. (citations omitted).
168. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
169. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
170. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 471 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 468.
172. Id. at 472 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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might have been relevant to establish an inclination to purchase legal,
sexually oriented material. Thus, the court defined the defendant's
predisposition based solely on the incident before it-an incident insti-
gated by the government.
In other child pornography sting cases where the court has found
predisposition, the defendant previously had violated child pornogra-
phy laws or had a reputation for purchasing child pornography prior
to the incident in question. 173 Although these prior violations did not
always result in convictions,' 74 they formed a basis for reasonable sus-
picion and arguably justified targeting these individuals as potential
child pornography purchasers. Keith Jacobson had no prior convic-
tions, reputation evidence or prior incidents from which to infer pre-
disposition. 7 ' Thus, the court allowed the government to establish
predisposition by showing that Jacobson "took the bait" that the gov-
ernment offered. Defining predisposition by reference to the incident
in question ensures that a defendant will never be able to raise a valid
entrapment defense. 176
Although the undercover operation in Jacobson supposedly
tested the defendant's predisposition through progressive solicitation,
these solicitations also generated responses from thousands of individ-
uals who were not "predisposed," that is, individuals whose responses
merited no further governmental targeting. 77 Thus, the government
cannot infer predisposition merely from an individual's response to a
173. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Musslyn, 865 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1988).
174. See, e.g., Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521; United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1228 (1984).
175. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 470-71 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted in part,
111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991).
176. "Predisposition has been defined as 'the defendant's state of mind before his initial
exposure to government agents.'" United States v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 299, 303 (6th Cir. 1988)
(quoting United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1112 (6th Cir. 1984)); see also United
States v. Marren, 890 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d
Cir. 1983); United States v. Fields, 689 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1982). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1177 (6th ed. 1990) defines predisposition as follows: "For purposes of entrapment defense,
[predisposition] may be defined as defendant's inclination to engage in illegal activity for which
he has been charged, i.e., that he is ready and willing to commit the crime. It focuses on
defendant's state of mind before government agents suggest that he commit the crime." Id.
Defining predisposition on the basis of the incident being prosecuted precludes a
defendant from raising a valid due process defense. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying
text. In cases where a defendant enters an inconsistent plea (i.e., he pleads not guilty and
raises entrapment), the prosecution will have to prove all of the substantive elements of the
charge. The prosecution's burden with respect to the entrapment defense in these cases will
still be relatively easier, however, because the court has accepted that responses to the
government's questionnaires establish predisposition.
177. Mitchell, 915 F.2d at 526 n.8.
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sexual attitude survey. Rather, the test of predisposition must hinge
on the individual's conduct prior to any contact with the government.
Contrary to prior federal court decisions,'" Jacobson does not
require the prosecution to establish predisposition by reference to
prior convictions, previous conduct, or reputation evidence since the
very incident being prosecuted will suffice. In effect, Jacobson
changes the substantive law, reducing the proof required for a convic-
tion.. Although the prosecution still must establish predisposition
"beyond a reasonable doubt," in effect the court has tipped the scale
in favor of conviction by redefining predisposition to include the inci-
dent at issue. By making it easier for the government to establish
predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt, the court has undermined
the protections embodied in that burden of proof. Because of the rela-
tive ease of establishing predisposition after the defendant has
purchased the illegal material, the government should at least be
required to have a reasonable suspicion before it can even target an
individual for an undercover operation of this kind.179
2. THE OBJECTIVE THEORY
Since Sorrells v. United States,8 0 courts have generally rejected
the objective theory of entrapment, deferring instead to undercover
law enforcement practices. 8' Nevertheless, the objective theory
remains popular among commentators and state courts.1 82  This
approach-which shifts the focus from the defendant's predisposition
to the government's conduct-preserves individual autonomy and
forces the government to remain accountable for its conduct.'83 The
objective approach to the entrapment defense is also crucial because
178. See Marren, 890 F.2d 924; United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1986);
Fields, 689 F.2d 122 (defining predisposition as the defendant's inclination to commit the
offense prior to his contact with the government).
179. Requiring the government to possess a reasonable suspicion of a suspect's
predisposition to purchase child pornography through the mail before targeting the individual
through reference to prior convictions for this offense, specific instances of conduct, or
reputation follows the nature of proof the prosecution would offer at trial. Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, in cases where character is properly in issue, i.e., cases where predisposition
is an issue, the prosecution may prove its case through such references. FED. R. EvID. 404,
405.
180. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
181. See supra notes 42-167 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Official Draft 1962) (endorsing the objective
theory of entrapment).
183. Although the objective theory of entrapment and the due process defense are similar
because both focus on the level of governmental conduct, they do have some differences. See
Mascolo, supra note 46, at 25-28 (listing the differences between entrapment and the due
process defense.).
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Hampton v. United States"8 4 casts doubt on the viability of the due
process defense. 185
Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States
18 6
articulates a Supreme Court policy barring the use of evidence which
the government procures with "unclean hands."18 7 This policy is
based on the belief that, as the "omnipresent teacher," the govern-
ment should act equitably. In Jacobson, the defendant argued that the
government had committed four separate felonies in procuring Jacob-
son's one illegal order. 18  Among other tactics, it had employed
highly deceptive correspondence, assuring Jacobson that the "Far
Eastern Trading Company had found a lawful means of transmitting
sexually explicit material through the mail." 89 Using deceptive tech-
niques tO ensnare an "unwary criminal"'' is quite different from
using such techniques against someone whose past criminal record
consists of a single drunk driving conviction thirty years earlier.191 It
defies the belief that government should act equitably and raises seri-
ous questions about what limitations, if any, are placed on the govern-
ment's zeal.
Two other factors highlight the unfairness of the government's
conduct in Jacobson. First, in attempting to target the greatest
number of individuals with its reverse sting operation, the Postal Ser-
vice ignored its own guidelines. The guidelines for sting operations
require an individual's name to appear on two independent sources
before the Postal Service can solicit the individual for illegal activ-
ity;192 Jacobson's name had appeared only on the Electric Moon's
184. 425 U.S. 484 (1976). See supra notes 66-84 and accompanying text.
185. The objective theory could be used in conjunction with the subjective theory, allowing
courts both to consider the defendant's predisposition as well as evaluate the extent and nature
of governmental involvement in the undercover operation. Cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967) (adopting a two pronged test with a subjective component, which focuses on the
individual's expectation of privacy, and an objective component, which focuses on society's
willingness to accept that expectation as reasonable).
186. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 483; see also Mascolo, supra note 46, at 13.
18' . Appellant's Brief at 18, United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990) (No.
88-2097NE), cert. granted in part, 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991).
189. Id.
190. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); see also, e.g., United States v.
Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.
1983); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980).
191. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 472 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 473. According to Raymond J. Mack, a postal inspector and a witness at
Jacobson's trial, the Postal Inspection Service was to target only those individuals whose
names appeared independently on at least two lists from the following sources: "mailing lists
seized by postal inspectors in separate child pornography investigations; incoming child
pornography seized by the United States Customs Service; programs conducted by the FBI;
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mailing list. Had the government followed its own solicitation proce-
dures, Jacobson would never have been a target. Requiring the gov-
ernment to stay within its self-delineated boundaries is reasonable,
given the court's refusal to recognize an individual's right to be free
from undercover investigations. 193
Second, the questionnaires sent to potential targets-purportedly
designed to test an individual's predisposition to receive child pornog-
raphy through the mail-deceived thousands of individuals into dis-
closing extremely personal information about their sexual attitudes by
asking a wide range of questions unrelated to child pornography.194
The counterargument is that assumption of risk principles preclude
any invasion of privacy claims by individuals who respond to these
surveys. Yet these deceptive, sweeping questions raise issues about
the voluntariness of an individual's response, thus casting doubt on
the assumption of risk defense. Furthermore, using scarce resources
to conduct random sampling for potential targets amounts to hit-or-
miss law enforcement.
B. Validity of Jacobson's Due Process Defense
Federal courts have accepted a due process challenge to under-
cover government operations only three times, none of them involving
child pornography stings."95 In fact, the Supreme Court's recent plu-
rality decision in Hampton suggests that due process is no longer a
viable defense to governmental conduct in drug sting operations. 96
The Eighth Circuit, in effect, extended Hampton to child pornography
stings in Jacobson, perhaps signalling a trend toward eliminating the
due process defense altogether.
Courts claim to allow due process as a defense to governmental
conduct that "shocks the conscience"' 97 or is otherwise "outrageous."
In Jacobson, the government employed its undercover operation in
investigations of mail order dealers of child pornography conducted by metropolitan police
departments and state police agencies; or Postal Inspection Service regional testing programs."
Id. Calvin M. Comfort, a prohibited mailing specialist with the Postal Inspection Service,
testified at trial that the Electric Moon's mailing list was the Postal Inspection Service's only
source of Jacobson's name. Id.
193. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 469.
194. United States v. Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521, 526 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1686 (1991).
195. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986) (selling cocaine); United States
v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1978) (manufacturing LSD); Greene v. United States, 454
F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) (bootlegging).
196. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) ("The remedy of the [predisposed]
criminal defendant with respect to the acts of Government agents ... lies solely in the defense
of entrapment.").
197. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
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violation of its own regulations and without reasonable suspicion that
Jacobson had committed a crime. Furthermore, it enticed Jacobson
to succumb to purchasing child pornography through the mail, assur-
ing him that it was legal. Then, after providing child pornography to
Jacobson, the government prosecuted him for purchasing it. The
Eighth Circuit found that this governmental conduct was not outra-
geous enough to allow a due process defense. Its criteria for determin-
ing outrageousness are inadequate.
United States v. Johnson suggests appropriate factors to deter-
mine if the police conduct intruded on constitutional due process pro-
tections.1 98 One key factor in Johnson was the "preexistence of a
criminal enterprise."1 99 Jacobson did not consider this factor, perhaps
because Jacobson's "criminal enterprise" consisted of purchasing only
one illegal magazine and a set of photographs-the items that the
government sold to him. Another factor in Johnson was the govern-
ment's direction and control over the criminal enterprise. If the court
had applied this factor in Jacobson, it would have discovered that the
government advertised, manufactured, and supplied the child pornog-
raphy at issue. Also, unlike Johnson, who responded to an advertise-
ment in an illegal magazine, Jacobson placed an order only after
postal inspectors sent him ten ostensibly legal mailings.
Another facet of due process is fairness to the defendant. In
Sherman v. United States,2°  Justice Frankfurter observed that
"[h]uman nature is weak enough and sufficiently beset by temptations
without government adding to them and generating crime."2"1 The
Sherman court acknowledged that an individual undergoing drug
addiction therapy would have difficulty rejecting encouragement to
sell drugs.20 2 In Jacobson, once the defendant expressed an interest in
preteen sexuality, the government solicited his orders for material
depicting sexually explicit conduct by minors while assuring him that
such conduct was completely legal.20 3 In fairness to defendants,
courts must consider the nature of the inducement when determining
whether the government's conduct exceeds permissible bounds.
The government's offers of child pornography in reverse sting
operations assume that the world is made up of two kinds of people:
198. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
199. United States v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1988).
200. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
201. Id. at 384.
202. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 25, 30-31 and accompanying text.
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the predisposed and the non-predisposed. 204 Only predisposed indi-
viduals-those who have actually purchased these materials in the
past-will respond to the government's solicitations. Offering these
materials to those who are not predisposed poses no threat because
the upright will reject these offers. Therefore, the government targets
individuals without acknowledging that criminality often depends on
situational factors,20 5 such as the purported confidentiality of the
transaction and the defendant's misplaced reliance on representations
of the legality of the undertaking. Courts should consider that persis-
tent government enticements may be too great to overcome. This
determination should be made even if the "unwary innocent" is a
pedophile.
According to both dissenters in Jacobson, the government's sting
created the criminal activity.206 But for the government's targeting of
Jacobson and repeated soliciting of his orders for nearly two and a
half years, he would have continued "minding his own business.
20 7
The record contained no evidence that he had ever violated any child
obscenity or abuse laws or even solicited child pornography in the
past.208
V. CONCLUSION
The government's concern for protecting children from the
exploitation inherent in producing child pornography is unquestiona-
bly important .2°  Nonetheless, long-standing principles of protection
of individual freedom must temper "overzealous" law enforcement.210
Using reverse stings against individuals such as Jacobson, whose prior
conduct prompted no reasonable suspicion, raises serious doubts
about the limits of governmental conduct. Jacobson suggests that the
government has no restrictions when it comes to child pornography.
The government's conduct certainly "falls below standards, to which
common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental
power."' 21 ' Recent decisions suggest that committing the crime of
204. See Gary T. Marx, Who Really Gets Stung?: Some Issues Raised by the New Police
Undercover Work, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 165, 172 (1982).
205. Id.
206. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 470-71 (8th Cir. 1990) (Lay and Heaney, JJ.,
dissenting), cert. granted in part, 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991).
207. Id. at 471 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 472.
209. Some may argue that attacking the problem at the production stage is the most
effective way of eradicating it. Yet given that most child pornography is produced outside the
United States, this can be only part of the solution.
210. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 381 (1958).
211. Id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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purchasing child pornography establishes a predisposition. 21 2
Because predisposition is dispositive of an individual's defenses of
entrapment and due process, the government should have a reason-
able suspicion of an individual's predisposition to make such
purchases, by reference to prior convictions or reputation, before
targeting him.213
The scarcity of law enforcement resources also militates against
using these operations indiscriminately. Postal inspectors spent
nearly two and a half years to secure the conviction of one individual
prosecuted for requesting a sexually explicit magazine that never
would have entered United States mails had the government not put it
there.214  These law enforcement resources would have been better
spent in soliciting orders from those who had demonstrated predispo-
sition prior to the investigation.21 5 If the government's role is one of
deterrence, its efforts should concentrate on preventing crime, not cre-
ating it.
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212. See supra notes 173, 178 and accompanying text.
213. Cf. Robert A. Brooks, III, Comment, Undercover Searches-Should Assumption of
Risk Principles be Used to Render Undercover Searches Inherently Reasonable?, 65 U. DET. L.
REV. 113, 124 (1987) (arguing in favor of adopting a rule limiting undercover searches to
situations in which a suspect expresses to the police officer a willingness to engage in criminal
activity).
214. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 476 (8th Cir. 1990) (Lay and Heaney, JJ.,
dissenting), cert. granted in part, Ill S. Ct. 1618 (1991). When investigators searched
Jacobson's apartment, the only illegal magazine they found was the one he had purchased
from the postal inspectors. Id. at 472.
215. United States v. Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1686
(1991); United States v. Musslyn, 865 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Johnson, 855
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